Friday, April 23, 2010

'Εκτακτη Κινητοποίηση σήμερα 6:30 Προπύλαια




ΟΛΟΙ στην έκτακτη ΚΙΝΗΤΟΠΟΙΗΣΗ σήμερα στις 6.30 στα ΠΡΟΠΥΛΑΙΑ

και πορεία στη Βουλή και στα γραφεία της Ευρωπαικής Ένωσης,

ενάντια στην προσφυγή της κυβέρνησης στο ΔΝΤ

4 comments:

Σπίθας said...

Είναι ανοιχτά τα γραφεία της Ευρωπαίκής Ένωσης...;

Μήπως τρακάρουμε με τον Αλαβάνο, βρε Γιάννη;

LEFT LIBERAL SYNTHESIS said...

Σπιθα δεν ξέρω
Και μεταξύ μας η στοχοποίηση της ΕΕ που φανηκε off side
Αλλά τετοια μέρα,καλύτερα στους δρόμους με λάθος στόχο,παρά τίποτε
Τα γνωστά αδιέξοδα

Σπίθας said...

Mήπως ξέρω, εγώ..
Δεν διαφωνώ, απλώς, κάνω τον συνήγορο του διαβόλου.:)

Πέσαμε για μακροβούτια σε βαθιά νερά.
Μα να προσέχουμε να μην πάθουμε την νόσο των δυτών.
Ξέρεις, χάνουν τον προσανατολισμό τους..

Υ.Γ.
Αλλά είτε πάμε προς τα πάνω, εις τον "αφρό της θάλασσας" είτε προς τον βυθό..μάλλον, δεν αλλάζει, κάτι, έτσι;

Στη θάλασσα οι καρχαρίες
Στη στεριά οι ρινόκεροι..

Elias said...

Γιάννη,είμαι Σόφια, σήμερα γυρνάω, και ετοιμάζω paper για χειρισμούς σε θέματα δημ/κής πολιτικής..Σαν διαδήλωση ανάποδη δηλαδή, γνήσιος cognitariatos!


Elias Karavolias,
(to be published, in the

-Liberal Democrats Research News

and the academic papers of the

-Institute for Public Policy and Research ,

(London, May 2010)

΄΄New Age Economics’ Stabilization Programs : basic theories and research ΄΄


Basic Academic Research

1. Rethinking Monetary Stabilization in the Presence of an Asset Bubble

Marc D. Hayford ,A. G. (Tassos) Malliaris Loyola University of Chicago - Department of Economics

2. Asymmetric Fiscal Stabilization Policy and the Public Deficit

Karin Mayr ,Johann Scharler. Vienna,Linz

3 .Long-term debt and optimal policy in the fiscal theory of the price level

Cohrane J, University of Chicago


4.Fiscal stabilisation and debt

S. Wren-Lewis, Merton College, Oxford,
C. Leith at Glasgow University ,
T. Kirsanova at Exeter University




Some fiscal policy myths

-“Ricardian Equivalence means fiscal policy does not work”

-Temporary increases in government spending raise demand even if consumers are totally Ricardian

-In an open economy independent fiscal action gets crowded out through an appreciation

-If interest rates are stuck at zero, and the fiscal expansion is temporary, the exchange rate should not appreciate.

-Any increase in government borrowing crowds out private borrowing

-Even if we deny that prices can be sticky, the zero bound is a fact, and it prevents demand adjustment

.


Fiscal expansion without higher debt?

-Inter temporal incentives

-Anticipated VAT increases – fiscal policy as monetary policy
•Tax financed temporary increases in government spending
(Will expand demand if consumers are Ricardian)

•Redistribution from unconstrained to credit constrained consumers
•All redistribute, but so does monetary policy



Outside of the zero bound, is the conventional assignment still right?

-Given lags, precautionary fiscal expansion may on occasion be warranted

-Theory ,fusion of two literatures

1)Dynamic optimal taxation theory /Schmitt-Grohe, S. and Uribe, M. (2004) – sticky prices make an important difference

2)Keynesian theory (Woodford – social welfare measure of business cycle costs)

-(Robust?) Result: If monetary policy unconstrained, optimal fiscal demand management is no demand management /Eser, F, Leith, C and Wren-Lewis, S (2008)




Fiscal policy still has a stabilisation role in changing relative prices

•If wages as well as prices are sticky, tax changes can help ‘correct’ the real wage .
•Tax changes can offset cost-push shocks
•Tax measures may be more efficient at pricking asset bubbles in particular markets than general interest rate changes.


Optimal debt policy: the random walk result

•Assume away default risk, and assume infinitely lived Ricardian consumers
•Taxation is distortionary , so any non-negative government debt has social costs
•Despite this, if a demand shock raises government debt, the optimal response is to live with this higher level of debt
•Essentially a tax smoothing result


How best to achieve gradual and erratic debt reduction?

-Targets set by governments are likely to be economically and politically sub-optimal

-Governments have a temptation to be over optimistic in making fiscal projections

-Need Fiscal Councils to

-Independently forecast development of government debt

-Advise on the optimal timing and speed of debt reduction (have the political authority to act as an effective public watchdog )



By Elias Karavolias